In late December 2025, the Federal Communications Commission took a decisive step that will reshape how uncrewed aircraft systems are regulated, procured, and trusted in the United States.
The FCC expanded its Covered List to include all uncrewed aircraft systems and critical UAS components produced in foreign countries, along with communications and video surveillance equipment identified under Section 1709 of the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act. This action followed a formal National Security Determination issued by an Executive Branch interagency body with national security authority and was not discretionary, as outlined in the FCC’s December 22, 2025 Public Notice.
For many operators, this is the first time federal communications policy has directly intersected with day-to-day fleet decisions.
Much of the drone industry has simplified this moment as a “DJI ban.” That framing misses the larger signal and, more importantly, the broader scope of what Section 1709 actually covers.
For years, drones were largely treated as commercial electronics with aviation considerations. That framework no longer applies.
Federal agencies now classify modern UAS as dual-use platforms. They support mapping, inspection, research, and public safety, but they also function as mobile sensor networks capable of persistent surveillance, sensitive data collection, and operational disruption.
The FCC’s action aligns drone policy with how the government already treats telecommunications infrastructure, cybersecurity tools, and surveillance systems. Drones are now regulated as part of the nation’s critical technology ecosystem, not as isolated flight hardware.
Section 1709 is widely misunderstood. It does not name a single drone manufacturer, and it does not operate as a brand-specific prohibition.
Instead, Section 1709 directs the FCC to restrict communications and video surveillance equipment or services when an appropriate national security agency determines that such equipment poses an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or public safety.
When combined with the FCC’s December 2025 update, Section 1709 now clearly extends into the UAS domain. This includes not only complete aircraft, but also critical subsystems that enable flight, data transmission, and control, including:
• Data transmission devices
• Communications systems
• Flight controllers
• Ground control stations
• Navigation systems
• Cameras and sensors
• Batteries and battery management systems
• Motors
The key distinction is this. Risk is assessed by production origin and supply-chain control, not by marketing category. A system sold as commercial, enterprise, or recreational is treated the same if it relies on foreign-produced components or opaque data pathways
DJI is frequently referenced because of its market share, but the FCC determination does not single out DJI or any other brand by name.
The concern is structural.
Federal agencies cite recurring risks tied to foreign-produced UAS and components, including:
• Legal regimes that can compel manufacturers to provide data or access
• Firmware update pathways outside U.S. control
• Limited ability to audit software and component provenance
• Risk of fleet-wide disruption during emergencies or geopolitical events
These conclusions are supported by guidance from DHS, CISA, NIST, and real-world conflict analysis showing how commercially available drones can be repurposed for surveillance, targeting, or disruption with minimal modification
From a national security perspective, trust cannot hinge on intent statements or user agreements alone.
This decision does not ground fleets overnight, but it clearly establishes the direction of policy.
Organizations operating in public safety, infrastructure, energy, research, and enterprise environments should expect:
• Increased scrutiny during FCC equipment authorization
• Procurement reviews that go beyond surface-level NDAA claims
• RFP language that emphasizes place of manufacture and supply-chain transparency
• Legal, IT, and cybersecurity teams playing a larger role in drone decisions
• Fewer exceptions granted for foreign-produced platforms
For many teams, the challenge is not disagreement with the policy. It is navigating uncertainty while continuing operations.
At Inspired Flight, we recognize that many operators are being asked to interpret overlapping guidance from the FCC, NDAA, DHS, and internal procurement offices, often at the same time.
Our role is not just to provide aircraft. It is to help teams translate policy into practical decisions without disrupting operations.
Inspired Flight platforms are:
• Designed and manufactured in the United States
• Built with transparent, auditable supply chains
• NDAA compliant by design, not retrofit
• Supported by domestic engineering, service, and training teams
Equally important, we work directly with customers to clarify how these regulatory changes apply to their specific missions, timelines, and procurement requirements. Clarity matters as much as capability.
The FCC’s action is not an endpoint. It is part of a broader realignment of U.S. airspace, cybersecurity, and industrial policy.
Drones are now treated as critical systems, not disposable tools. As that reality sets in, trust, transparency, and domestic control will increasingly define which platforms are viable for professional operations.
At Inspired Flight, this moment reinforces a long-held belief. Building trusted aircraft in the United States is not about reacting to policy shifts. It is about preparing for environments where reliability, accountability, and security are non-negotiable.
For operators navigating this transition, the most important step is asking the right questions. We help teams translate policy into practical decisions without disrupting operations.
Is Section 1709 a DJI ban?
No. Section 1709 does not name DJI or any specific manufacturer. It authorizes restrictions on communications and video surveillance equipment, including UAS, when national security agencies determine that such equipment poses an unacceptable risk. The FCC’s action applies broadly based on production origin and supply chain control, not brand
What types of equipment does Section 1709 cover?
Section 1709 applies to communications and video surveillance equipment and services. When extended to UAS, this includes not only aircraft, but also critical components such as radios, data links, flight controllers, ground control stations, cameras, batteries, and related software systems
Does this affect existing drone fleets today?
The FCC action does not automatically ground existing fleets. However, it directly impacts FCC equipment authorization for new products and sets a clear direction for future procurement, approvals, and policy decisions.
Why does place of manufacture matter more than intent or use case?
Federal agencies have determined that certain foreign legal regimes, supply chain opacity, and software control pathways introduce risks that cannot be mitigated through user agreements or operational policies alone. As a result, risk is assessed by production origin and supply chain transparency, not by how a product is marketed or used
How does this relate to NDAA compliance?
NDAA compliance remains important, but it is no longer the sole benchmark. Section 1709 and the FCC Covered List add an additional layer that focuses on communications security, data control, and supply chain resilience.
What should operators be doing now?
Operators should review where their aircraft and critical components are produced, understand FCC equipment authorization implications, and ensure procurement decisions align with emerging federal guidance.
How can Inspired Flight help?
Inspired Flight works with teams to interpret these changes, validate compliance documentation, and plan fleet strategies using U.S.-built, NDAA-compliant aircraft designed for professional and sensitive operations.